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UPCOMING EVENTS
Security relies upon good programming and correct adherence to
 well-designed standards. If the standards are sloppy, then security
 has been compromised from the outset.
Smart grids, which include the smart meters being rolled out to millions
 of homes and the upstream equipment used by electricity suppliers,
 are often secured by the Open Smart Grid Protocol (OSGP),
 developed by the Energy Service Network Association
 (ESNA). It’s estimated there are more than 4m devices using OSGP.
If there’s one rule about cryptography it’s that it is difficult to prove
 there are no weaknesses. Newly developed ciphers and methods
 are subjected to thorough cryptanalysis and peer review –
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 and it’s not advisable to try and re-invent the wheel and develop a
 new form of cryptographic method or cipher. And yet the ESNA did
 just that. Ever since OSGP was standardised in 2012 ESNA has
 been under fire for its decision, and now researchers have
 discovered just how bad that decision was.
What is the smart grid?
The smart grid is an internet of devices such as electrical meters and
 electricity distribution equipment. The idea is that network connectivity
 provides better monitoring of energy use, locating faults, and no need
 to send out someone to read the meter. But with this convenience
 comes the insecurity of being attached to the public internet – hence
 the need for protection.
Normally these devices communicate using secure tunnels. This
 shows a secure tunnel created between the power company and the
 home device.
The power company sends its public key to the smart meter, which
 creates a new session key, encrypts this with the power company’s
 public key, and passes it back. The power company, using its private
 key, decrypts this to determine the session key for the connection.
 Both sides will then use their copies of the session key to encrypt
 traffic passed between them during the session.
If someone determines the private key of the power company, they
 can then find out the session key and read – even alter – the
 communications. The same happened with the Superfish 
vulnerability, where the private key could be easily determined by
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 trying a few well-known pass phrases.
What’s the weakness?
The current problem with OSGP lies in ESNA’s decision to
 cook up its own, flawed, cryptographic methods and its non-
standard implementation of the RC4 cipher – rather than using any of
 the well-defined, well-designed cryptography standards that are
 available.
This vulnerability makes it easy to acquire private keys, something
 highlighted by academic researchers Philipp Jovanovic and Samuel
 Neves, who demonstrated how easy it was to crack OSGP’s
 encryption using easy-to-implement key-recovery attacks.
Their focus was on the OMA digest, which is the core of the
 authentication infrastructure. A digest is a means of turning data into a
 cryptographic fingerprint, known as a hash, which is encrypted
 (“signed”) using the secret, private key. There are many well-defined
 methods for this, such as HMAC-SHA256 and AES-GMAC,
 which use standard crytographic methods to produce a signed hash
 signature.
However, OSGP uses a combination of the OMA digest, the EN 
14908 algorithm, and the RC4 cipher. The choice of RC4 seems
 strange, especially as it has known key- and plaintext-recovery
 attacks, but the home-brew OMA digest leaves the OSGP with
 security so weak that the researchers were able to recover private
 keys using just 13 queries.
We need better locks
For something as important as our energy infrastructure, where the
 tenth decimal point can mean a cost of millions and where a large-
scale outage could lead to serious economic losses, it’s just
 incredible that ESNA has decided to go it alone and subsequently
 made a hash of it (if you’ll excuse the pun).
OSGP is currently used in over 4m smart grid devices, which can now
 be seen as having little in the way of real security. As we scale-up the
 Internet of Things, there’s a quite reasonable concern that too little
 thought has been given to how they will be secured.
Also, I think the public key infastructure we have created for the
 internet is deeply flawed, especially in the cryptographic methods
 used, many of which are past their useful life. While onion routing, as
 exemplified by Tor, often gets a bad press because of its use for
 nefarious activities in the deep web, it’s methods are well-proven
‘Windows 10 on
 everything’ is
 Microsoft’s gambit to
 proft from
 its competitors
Has Tesla cracked the
 grid energy
 storage problem?
Manifesto Check: Plaid
 Cymru’s defence
 policy is ‘vague
 and uncosted’
When amateurs do the job of a professional, the result is smart grids secured by dumb crypto
https://theconversation.com/when-amateurs-do-the-job-of-a-professional-the-result-is-smart-grids-secured-by-dumb-crypto-41769[17/05/2015 13:31:56]
 Like us on Facebook
 Follow us on Twitter
 Sign up to our free daily newsletter
 and secure.
We really need to start kicking the tyres of our internet infrastructure,
 pension off those aspects that are past their use-by date and
 introduce better, newer methods. The more that our economy goes
 online, the more is at stake. I can’t see someone wishing to patch
 millions of smart meters or devices as new vulnerabilities are found,
 but can certainly imagine a load of rogue actors who’d take
 advantage of them.
This needs to be right, right from the outset. After all, there’s no
 greater threat to the internet than no electricity to power it.
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I'm going with http://cryptech.is/ -a community driven HSM being designed by people I 
know, and so on a personal level trust to understand the design goals. Its an FPGA based 
design which has openly available Verilog/VHDL and its compontents, such as the random 
number generator are out there for people to test by themselves.
I know its not going to fix the core issue you talk about, but in the light of misplaced trust in 
the centrally managed crypto economy, I think its worth pursuing. I am particularly 
concerned about the fall from grace of NIST, in terms of their oversight of technology we 
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